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Abstract
We consider the problem of designing revenue maximizing online posted-price mechanisms when
the seller has limited supply. A seller has k identical items for sale and is facing n potential buyers
(“agents”) that are arriving sequentially. Each agent is interested in buying one item. Each agent’s value
for an item is an independent sample from some fixed (but unknown) distribution with support [0, 1].
The seller offers a take-it-or-leave-it price to each arriving agent (possibly different for different agents),
and aims to maximize his expected revenue.
We focus on mechanisms that do not use any information about the distribution; such mechanisms
are called detail-free (or prior-independent). They are desirable because knowing the distribution is
unrealistic in many practical scenarios. We study how the revenue of such mechanisms compares to the
revenue of the optimal offline mechanism that knows the distribution (“offline benchmark”).
We present a detail-free online posted-price mechanism whose revenue is at most O((k logn)2/3)
less than the offline benchmark, for every distribution that is regular. In fact, this guarantee holds without
any assumptions if the benchmark is relaxed to fixed-price mechanisms. Further, we prove a matching
lower bound. The performance guarantee for the same mechanism can be improved toO(
√
k logn), with
a distribution-dependent constant, if the ratio kn is sufficiently small. We show that, in the worst case over
all demand distributions, this is essentially the best rate that can be obtained with a distribution-specific
constant.
On a technical level, we exploit the connection to multi-armed bandits (MAB). While dynamic pric-
ing with unlimited supply can easily be seen as an MAB problem, the intuition behind MAB approaches
breaks when applied to the setting with limited supply. Our high-level conceptual contribution is that
even the limited supply setting can be fruitfully treated as a bandit problem.
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1 Introduction
Consider a promoter that is interested in selling k tickets for a given concert. The seller is interested in max-
imizing her revenue from selling these tickets, and is offering the tickets on a website such as Ticketmaster.
Potential buyers (“agents”) arrive one after another, each with the goal of purchasing a ticket if the price is
smaller than the agent’s valuation. The seller expects n such agents to arrive. Whenever an agent arrives the
seller presents to him a take-it-or-leave-it price, and the agent makes a purchasing decision according to that
price. The seller can update the price taking into account the observed history and the number of remaining
items and agents.
We adopt a Bayesian view that the valuations of the buyers are IID samples from a fixed distribution,
called demand distribution. A standard assumption in a Bayesian setting is that the demand distribution is
known to the seller, who can design a specific mechanism tailored to this knowledge. (For example, the
Myerson optimal auction for one item sets a reserve price that is a function of the distribution). However, in
some settings this assumption is very strong, and should be avoided if possible. For example, when the seller
enters a new market, she might not know the demand distribution, and learning it through market research
might be costly. Likewise, when the market has experienced a significant recent change, the new demand
function might not be easily derived from the old data.
Ideally we would like to design mechanisms that perform well for any demand distribution, and yet do
not rely on knowing it. Such mechanisms are called detail-free,1 in the sense that the specification of the
mechanism does not depend on the details of the “environment”, in the spirit of Wilson’s Doctrine [43].
Learning about the demand distribution is an integral part of the problem that a detail-free mechanism faces.
The performance of such mechanisms is compared to a benchmark that does depend on the specific demand
distribution, as in [34, 31, 13, 25] and many other papers.
In this paper we take this approach and design detail-free, online posted-price mechanisms with revenue
that is close to the revenue of the optimal offline mechanism (that can depend on the demand distribution
and is not restricted to be posted price). Our main results are for any demand distribution that is regular, or
any demand distribution that satisfies the stronger condition of “monotone hazard rate”. Both conditions are
mild and standard, and even the stronger one is satisfied by most common distributions, such as the normal,
uniform, and exponential distributions.
Posted price mechanisms are commonly used in practice, and are appealing for several reasons. First, an
agent only needs to evaluate her offer rather than compute her private value exactly. Human agents tend to
find the former task much easier than the latter. Second, agents do not reveal their entire private information
to the seller: rather, they only reveal whether their private value is larger than the posted price. Third, posted-
price mechanisms are truthful (in dominant strategies) and moreover also group strategy-proof (a notion of
collusion resistance when side payments are not allowed). Further, detail-free posted-price mechanisms are
particularly useful in practice as the seller is not required to estimate the demand distribution in advance.
Similar arguments can be found in prior work, e.g. [22].
Our model. We consider the following limited supply auction model, which we term dynamic pricing with
limited supply. A seller has k items she can sell to a set of n agents (potential buyers), aiming to maximize
her expected revenue. The agents arrive sequentially to the market and the seller interacts with each agent
before observing future agents (in an online manner). We make the simplifying assumption that each agent
interacts with the seller only once, and the timing of the interaction cannot be influenced by the agent. (This
assumption is also made in other papers that consider our problem for special supply amounts [34, 7, 13].)
Each agent i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) is interested in buying one item, and has a private value vi for an item. The
private values are independently drawn from the same demand distribution F . The demand distribution F is
1An alternative term used to describe these mechanisms is prior-independent.
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unknown to the seller. We assume that F has bounded support, and an upper bound on the support is known
to the seller;2 by normalizing, it is known to the seller that support(F ) ⊂ [0, 1].
Whenever agent i arrives to the market the seller offers him a price pi for an item. The agent buys
the item if and only if vi ≥ pi, and in case she buys the item she pays pi (so the mechanism is incentive-
compatible). The seller never learns the exact value of vi, she only observes the agent’s binary decision
to buy the item or not. The seller selects prices pi using an online algorithm, that we henceforth call
pricing strategy. We are interested in designing pricing strategies with high revenue compared to a natural
benchmark, with minimal assumptions on the demand distribution.
Our main benchmark is the maximal expected revenue of an offline mechanism that is allowed to use
the demand distribution; henceforth, we will call it offline benchmark. This is a very strong benchmark, as
it has the following advantages over our mechanism: it is allowed to use the demand distribution, it is not
constrained to posted prices and is not constrained to run online. It is realized by a well-known Myerson
Auction [39] (which does rely on knowing the demand distribution).
High-level discussion. Absent the supply constraint, our problem fits into the multi-armed bandit (MAB)
framework [20]: in each round, an algorithm chooses among a fixed set of alternatives (“arms”) and observes
a payoff, and the objective is to maximize the total payoff over a given time horizon. Our setting corresponds
to (prior-free) MAB with stochastic payoffs [35]: in each round, the payoff is an independent sample from
some unknown distribution that depends on the chosen “arm” (price). This connection is exploited in [34,
16] for the special case of unlimited supply (k = n). The authors use a standard algorithm for MAB with
stochastic payoffs, called UCB1 [4]. Specifically, they focus on the prices {iδ : i ∈ N}, for some parameter
δ, and run UCB1 with these prices as “arms”. The analysis relies on the regret bound from [4].
However, neither the analysis nor the intuition behind UCB1 and similar MAB algorithms is directly
applicable for the setting with limited supply. Informally, the goal of an MAB algorithm would be to
converge to a price p that maximizes the expected per-round revenue R(p) , p(1 − F (p)). This is, in
general, a wrong approach if the supply is limited: indeed, selling at a price that maximizes R(·) may
quickly exhaust the inventory, in which case a higher price would be more profitable.
Our high-level conceptual contribution is showing that even the limited supply setting can be fruitfully
treated as a bandit problem. The MAB perspective here is that we focus on the trade-off between exploration
(acquiring new information) and exploitation (taking advantage of the information available so far). In
particular, we recover an essential feature of UCB1 that it does not separate exploration and exploitation, and
instead explores arms (prices) according to a schedule that unceasingly adapts to the observed payoffs. This
feature results, both for UCB1 and for our algorithm, in a much more efficient exploration of suboptimal
arms: very suboptimal arms are chosen very rarely even while they are being “explored”.
We use an “index-based” algorithm where each arm is deterministically assigned a numerical score
(“index”) based on the past history, and in each round an arm with a maximal index is chosen; the index of
an arm depends on the past history of this arm (and not on other arms). One key idea is that we define the
index of an arm according to the estimated expected total payoff from this arm given the known constraints,
rather than according to its estimated expected payoff in a single round. This idea leads to an algorithm that
is simple and (we believe) very natural. However, while the algorithm is simple its analysis is not: some new
ideas are needed, as the elegant tricks from prior work do not apply (see Section 4 for further discussion).
It is worth noting that a good index-based algorithm did not have to exist in our setting. Indeed, many
bandit algorithms in the literature are not index-based, e.g. EXP3 [5] and “zooming algorithm” [33] and their
respective variants. The fact that Gittins algorithm [27] and UCB1 [4] achieve (near-)optimal performance
with index-based algorithms was widely seen as an impressive contribution.
2This assumption enables concentration inequalities such as Chernoff Bounds. It corresponds to the assumption of bounded
rewards, which is very common in the literature on multi-armed bandits.
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Contributions. In all results below, we consider the dynamic pricing problem with limited supply: n
agents and k ≤ n items. We present pricing strategies with expected revenue that is close to the offline
benchmark, for large families of natural distributions. All our pricing strategies are deterministic and (triv-
ially) run in polynomial time. Our main result follows.
Theorem 1.1. There exists a detail-free pricing strategy such that for any regular demand distribution its
expected revenue is at least the offline benchmark minus O((k log n)2/3).
We emphasize that Theorem 1.1 holds for a pricing strategy that does not know the demand distribution.
The resulting mechanism is incentive-compatible as it is a posted price mechanism. The specific bound
O((k log n)2/3) is most informative when k ≫ log n, so that the dependence on n is insignificant; the focus
here is to optimize the power of k. (Note that any non-trivial bound must be below k.)
The proof of Theorem 1.1 consists of two stages. The first stage (immediate from Yan [44]) is to
observe that for any regular demand distribution the expected revenue of the best fixed-price strategy3 is
close to the offline benchmark. Henceforth, the expected revenue of the best fixed-price strategy will be
called the fixed-price benchmark. The second stage, which is our main technical contribution, is to show
that our pricing strategy achieves expected revenue that is close to the fixed-price benchmark. Surprisingly,
this holds without any assumptions on the demand distribution.
Theorem 1.2. There exists a detail-free pricing strategy whose expected revenue is at least the fixed-price
benchmark minus O((k log n)2/3). This result holds for every demand distribution. Moreover, this result is
the best possible up to a factor of O(log n).
As discussed above, we recover the MAB technique from [4] for the unlimited supply setting. The
corresponding contribution to the literature on MAB may be of independent interest.
If the demand distribution is regular and moreover the ratio kn is sufficiently small then the guarantee in
Theorem 1.1 can be improved to O(
√
k log n), with a distribution-specific constant.
Theorem 1.3. There exists a detail-free pricing strategy whose expected revenue, for any regular demand
distribution F , is at least the offline benchmark minus O(cF
√
k log n) whenever kn ≤ sF , where cF and sF
are positive constants that depend on F . For monotone hazard rate distributions one can take sF = 14 .
The bound in Theorem 1.3 is achieved using the pricing strategy from Theorem 1.1 with a different
parameter. Varying this parameter, we obtain a family of strategies that improve over the bound in Theo-
rem 1.1 in the “nice” setting of Theorem 1.3, and moreover have non-trivial additive guarantees for arbitrary
demand distributions. However, we cannot match both theorems with the same parameter.
Note that the rate-
√
k dependence on k in Theorem 1.3 contains a distribution-dependent constant cF
(which can be arbitrarily large, depending on F ), and thus is not directly comparable to the rate-k2/3 depen-
dence in Theorem 1.2. The distinction (and a significant gap) between bounds with and without distribution-
dependent constants is not uncommon in the literature on sequential decision problems, e.g. in [4, 34, 33].4
In fact, we show that the cF
√
k dependence on k is essentially the best possible.5 We focus on the
fixed-price benchmark (which is a weaker benchmark, so it gives to a stronger lower bound). Following the
literature, we define regret as the fixed-price benchmark minus the expected revenue of our pricing strategy.
Theorem 1.4. For any γ < 12 , no detail-free pricing strategy can achieve regret O(cF kγ) for all demand
distributions F and arbitrarily large k, n, where the constant cF can depend on F .
3A fixed-price strategy is a pricing strategy that offers the same price to all agents, as long as it has items to sell. The “best”
fixed-price strategy is one with the maximal expected revenue for a given demand distribution.
4For a particularly pronounced example, for the K-armed bandit problem with stochastic payoffs the best possible rates for
regret with and without a distribution dependent constant are respectively O(cF log n) and O(
√
Kn) [4, 5, 3].
5However, the lower bound in Theorem 1.4 does not match the upper bound in Theorem 1.3 since the latter assumes regularity.
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The bounds in Theorem 1.1 and Theorem 1.2 are uninformative when k = O(log2 n). We next provide
another detail-free, online posted-price mechanism that gives meaningful bounds – not depending on n – in
the case that k is very small (but bigger than some constant).
Theorem 1.5. There exists a detail-free pricing strategy such that for any MHR demand distribution its
expected revenue is at least the offline benchmark minus O(k3/4 poly log(k)).
2 Related Work
Dynamic pricing. Dynamic pricing problems and, more generally, revenue management problems, have
a rich literature in Operations Research. A proper survey of this literature is beyond our scope; see [13] for
an overview. The main focus is on parameterized demand distributions, with priors on the parameters.
The study of dynamic pricing with unknown demand distribution (without priors) has been initiated
in [16, 34]. Several special cases of our setting have been studied in [34, 7, 13], detailed below.
First, Kleinberg and Leighton [34] consider the unlimited supply case (building on the earlier work [16]).
Among other results, they study IID valuations, i.e. our setting with k = n. They provide upper bounds
on regret of order O(n2/3) and O(cF
√
n). 6 The latter bound is akin to Theorem 1.3 in that it assumes a
version of regularity, and depends on a distribution-specific constant cF . Further, they prove matching lower
bounds which, in particular, imply Theorem 1.4 for the special case of unlimited supply. 7
On the other extreme, Babaioff et al. [7] consider the case that the seller has only one item to sell (k = 1).
They provide a super-constant multiplicative lower bound for unrestricted demand distribution (with respect
to the online optimal mechanism), and a constant-factor approximation assuming MHR. Note that we also
use MHR to derive bounds that apply to the case of a very small k.
Besbes and Zeevi [13] consider a continuous-time version which (when specialized to discrete time)
is essentially equivalent to our setting with k = Ω(n). They prove a number of upper bounds on regret
with respect to the fixed-price benchmark, with guarantees that are inferior to ours. The key distinction
is that their pricing strategies separate exploration and exploitation. Assuming that the demand distribu-
tion F (·) and its inverse F−1(·) are Lipschitz-continuous, they achieve regret O(n3/4). They improve it
to O(n2/3) if furthermore the demand distributions are parameterized, and to O(
√
n) if this is a single-
parameter parametrization. Both results rely on knowing the parametrization: the mechanisms continuously
update the estimates of the parameter(s) and revise the current price according to these estimates. The upper
bounds in [13] should be contrasted with our O(k2/3) upper bound that applies to an arbitrary k and makes
no assumptions on the demand distribution, and the O(cF
√
k) improvement for MHR demand distributions.
Also, [13] contains an Ω(√n) lower bound for their notion of regret. Essentially, this lower bound com-
pares the best pricing strategy for a given demand distribution to the best (distribution-dependent) pricing
strategy for a fictitious environment where in every round the mechanism sells a fractional amount of good.
In particular, this lower bound does not have any immediate implications on regret with respect to either of
the two benchmarks that we use in this paper.
Online mechanisms. The study of online mechanisms was initiated by Lavi and Nisan [36], who unlike
us consider the case that each agent is interested in multiple items, and provide a logarithmic multiplicative
approximation. Below we survey only the most relevant papers in this line of work, in addition to the special
cases of our setting that we have already discussed.
6Throughout this section, we omit the log factors in regret bounds.
7The construction in [34] that proves Theorem 1.4(a) for the unlimited supply case is contained in the proof of a theorem on
adversarial valuations, but the construction itself only uses IID valuations.
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Several papers [12, 16, 34, 15] consider online mechanisms with unlimited supply and adversarial valua-
tions (as opposed to limited supply and IID valuations in our setting). The mechanism in the initial paper [12]
requires the agents to submit bids and so is not posted-price. The subsequent work [16, 34, 15] provides
various improvements. In particular, Blum et al. [16] (among other results) design a simple posted-price
mechanism which achieves multiplicative approximation 1 + ǫ, for any ǫ > 0, with an additive term that
depends on ǫ. 8 Blum and Hartline [15] use a more elaborate posted-price mechanism to improve the ad-
ditive term. Kleinberg and Leighton [34] show that the simple mechanism in [16] achieves regret O(n2/3);
moreover, they provide a nearly matching lower bound of Ω(n2/3).
Papers [30, 23] study online mechanisms for limited supply and IID valuations (same as us), but their
mechanisms are not posted-price. Hajiaghayi et al. [30] consider an online auction model where players
arrive and depart online, and may misreport the time period during which they participate in the auction. This
makes designing strategy-proof mechanisms more challenging, and as a result their mechanisms achieve a
constant multiplicative approximation rather than additive regret. Devanur and Hartline [23] study several
variants of the limited-supply mechanism design problem: supply is known or unknown, online or offline.
Most related to our paper is their mechanism for limited, known, online supply. This mechanism is based
on random sampling and achieves constant (multiplicative) approximation, but is not posted-price. Our
mechanism is posted-price and achieves low (additive) regret.
Other work. Absent the supply constraint, our problem (and a number of related formulations) fit into
the multi-armed bandit (MAB) framework.9 MAB has a rich literature in Statistics, Operations Research,
Computer Science and Economics. A proper discussion of this literature is beyond the scope of this paper;
a reader can refer to [17, 28, 20] for background. Most relevant to our specific setting is the work on (prior-
free) MAB with stochastic payoffs, e.g. [35, 4], and MAB with Lipschitz-continuous stochastic payoffs,
e.g. [2, 32, 6, 33, 19]. The posted-price mechanisms in [16, 34, 15] described above are based on a well-
known MAB algorithm [5] for adversarial payoffs. The connection between online learning and online
mechanisms has been explored in a number of other papers, including [40, 24, 10, 9].
Recently, [22, 21, 44] studied the problem of designing an offline, sequential posted-price mechanisms
in Bayesian settings, where the distributions of valuations are not necessarily identical, yet are known to the
seller. Chawla et al. [22] provide constant multiplicative approximations. Yan [44] obtains a multiplicative
bound that is optimal for large k, and Chakraborty et al. [21] obtain a PTAS for all k.
Dynamic pricing is superficially similar to secretary problems [26, 8] in that an algorithm is sequentially
interacting with agents, each agent’s private value is a single number, and it is not known before this agent
arrives. However, in secretary problems the private value is revealed when the agent arrives, whereas in
dynamic pricing the algorithm is much more constrained in terms of information: the feedback is only
whether there is a sale.
3 Preliminaries
Throughout, we assume that agents’ valuations are drawn independently from a distribution F with support
in [0, 1], called demand distribution. We use p ∈ [0, 1] to denote a price. We let F (p) denote the c.d.f, and
S(p) = 1 − F (p) denote the sales rate at price p: the probability of making a sale at price p. Let R(p) =
p S(p) denote the revenue function: the expected single-round revenue at price p given that there is still at
least one item left. The demand distribution F is called regular if F (·) is twice differentiable and the revenue
8This result considers valuations in the range [1, H ], and the additive term also depends on H .
9To avoid a possible confusion, we note that the supply constraint in our setting may appear similar to the budget constraint
in line of work on budgeted MAB (see [18, 29] for details and further references). However, the “budget” in budgeted MAB is
essentially the duration of the experimentation phase (n), rather than the number of rounds with positive reward (k).
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function R(·) is concave: R′′(·) ≤ 0. We call F strictly regular if furthermore R′′(·) < 0. Then R(p) is
increasing for p ≤ pr and decreasing for p ≥ pr, where pr is the unique maximizer, known as the Myerson
reserve price (also known as the monopoly price). Moreover, the sales rate S(·) is strictly decreasing, so
the inverse S−1 is well-defined. We say F is a Monotone Hazard Rate (MHR) distribution if F (·) is twice
differentiable and the hazard rate H(p) , F ′(p)/S(p) is non-decreasing. All MHR distributions are regular.
A fixed-price strategy with n agents, k items and price p, denoted Ank(p), is a pricing strategy that
makes a fixed offer price p to every agent so long as fewer than k items have been sold, and stops afterwards
(equivalently, from that point always sets the price to ∞). Note that for the unlimited supply case Ann(p)
sells nS(p) items in expectation.
A pricing strategy is called detail-free if it does not use the knowledge of the demand distribution. We are
interested in designing detail-free pricing strategies with good performance for every demand distribution
in some (large) family of distributions. We compare our mechanisms to two benchmarks that depend on
the demand distribution: the maximal expected revenue of an offline mechanism (the offline benchmark),
and the maximal expected revenue of a fixed price mechanism (the fixed-price benchmark). An offline
mechanism that maximizes expected revenue was given in the seminal paper of Myerson [39]; it is not an
online posted price mechanism.
Let Rev(A) be the total expected revenue achieved by mechanism A. We define the regret of A with
respect to the fixed-price benchmark as follows: Regret(A) , maxp Rev[Ank(p)] − Rev(A). Thus, regret
is the additive loss in expected revenue compared to the best fixed-price mechanism. (Note that the regret of
A could, in principle, be a negative number, since the fixed-price benchmark is not generally the Bayesian
optimal pricing strategy for distribution F .)
Benchmarks Comparison. We observe that for regular demand distributions, the fixed-price benchmark
is close to the offline benchmark. This result is immediate from Yan [44]; we provide a self-contained proof
in Appendix A.
Lemma 3.1 (Yan [44]). For each regular demand distribution there exists a fixed-price strategy whose
expected revenue is at least the offline benchmark minus O(√k).
Lemma 3.1 implies that any pricing strategy with regret O(R), R = Ω(
√
k) with respect to the fixed-
price benchmark has the same asymptotic regret O(R) with respect to the offline benchmark, as long as
the demand distribution is regular, and in particular if it is MHR. Therefore, the rest of the paper can focus
on the fixed-price benchmark. In particular, our main result, Theorem 1.1 for regular distributions, follows
from Theorem 1.2 that addresses the fixed-price benchmark.
Furthermore, the expected revenue of a fixed-price mechanism has an easy characterization:
Claim 3.2. Let A be the fixed-price mechanism with price p. Let ν(p) = pmin(k, n S(p))). Then
ν(p)−O(p
√
k log k) ≤ Rev(A) ≤ ν(p). (1)
It follows that for a strictly regular demand distribution the bound in Lemma 3.1 is satisfied for the fixed
price p∗ = argmaxp ν(p) = max(pr, S−1( kn)), where pr = argmaxp p S(p) is the Myerson reserve price.
Proof. Let us focus on the first inequality in (1) (the second one is obvious). Let Xt be the indicator variable
of sale in round t. Denote X =
∑n
t=1Xt and let µ = E[X]. Then by Chernoff Bounds (Theorem 4.7(a))
with probability at least 1− 1k it holds that X ≥ µ−O(
√
µ log k), in which case
#sales = min(k,X) ≥ min(k, µ −O(
√
µ log k)) ≥ min(k, µ)−O(
√
k log k),
which implies the claim since µ = nS(p).
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4 The main technical result: the upper bound in Theorem 1.2
This section is devoted to the main technical result (the upper bound in Theorem 1.2) which asserts that
there exists a detail-free pricing strategy whose regret with respect to the fixed-price benchmark is at most
O((k log n)2/3). This result is very general, as it makes no assumptions on the demand distribution.
As discussed in Section 1, we design an algorithm that carefully optimizes the trade-off between explo-
ration and exploitation. We use an index-based algorithm in which each arm is assigned a numerical score,
called index, so that in each round an arm with the highest index is picked. The index of an arm depends
only on the past history of this arm. In prior work on index-based bandit algorithms the index of an arm was
defined according to estimated expected payoff from this arm in a single round. Instead, we define the index
according to estimated expected total payoff from this arm given the constraints.
We apply the above idea to UCB1. The index in UCB1 is, essentially, the best available Upper Confidence
Bound (UCB) on the expected single-round payoff from a given arm. Accordingly, we define a new index,
so that the index of a given price corresponds to a UCB on the expected total payoff from this price (i.e.,
from a fixed-price strategy with this price), given the number of agents and the inventory size. Such index
takes into account both the average payoff from this arm (“exploitation”) and the number of samples for
this arm (“exploration”), as well as the supply constraint. In particular we recover the appealing property of
UCB1 that it does not separate “exploration” and “exploitation”, and instead explores arms (prices) according
to a schedule that unceasingly adapts to the observed payoffs.
There are several steps to make this approach more precise. First, while it is tempting to use the current
values for the number of agents and the inventory size to define the index, we adopt a non-obvious (but more
elegant) design choice to use the original values, i.e. the n and the k. Second, since the exact expected total
payoff for a given price is hard to quantify, we will instead use a natural approximation thereof provided by
ν(p) in Claim 3.2. In other words, our index will be a UCB on ν(p). Third, in specifying the UCB we will
use non-standard estimator from [33] to better handle prices with very low sales rate.
The main technical hurdle in the analysis is to “charge” each suboptimal price for each time that it is
chosen, in a way that the total regret is bounded by the sum of these charges and this sum can be usefully
bounded from above. The analysis of UCB1 accomplishes this via simple (but very elegant) tricks which,
unfortunately, fail in the limited supply setting.
An additional difficulty comes from the probabilistic nature of the analysis. While we adopt a well-
known trick – we define some high-probability events and assume that these events hold deterministically
in the rest of the analysis – choosing an appropriate collection of events is, in our case, non-trivial. Proving
that these events indeed hold with high probability relies on some non-standard tail bounds from prior work.
4.1 Our pricing strategy
Let us define our pricing strategy, called CappedUCB. The pricing strategy is initialized with a set P of
“active prices”. In each round t, some price p ∈ P is chosen. Namely, for each price p ∈ P we define a
numerical score, called index, and we pick a price with the highest index, breaking ties arbitrarily. Once k
items are sold, CappedUCB sets the price to ∞ and never sells any additional item.
Recall from Claim 3.2 that the expected revenue from the fixed-price strategy Ank(p) is approximated by
ν(p) , p ·min(k, n S(p)). In each round t, we define the index It(p) as a UCB on ν(p):
It(p) , p ·min(k, n SUBt (p)).
Here SUBt (p) is a UCB on the sales rate S(p), as defined below.
For each p ∈ P, let Nt(p) be the number of rounds before t in which price p has been chosen, and
let kt(p) be the number of items sold in these rounds. Then Ŝt(p) , kt(p)/Nt(p) is the current average
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sales rate. To avoid division by zero, we define Ŝt(p) to be equal to 1 when Nt(p) = 0. We will define
SUBt (p) = Ŝt(p) + rt(p), where rt(p) is a confidence radius: some number such that
|S(p)− Ŝt(p)| ≤ rt(p) (∀ p ∈ P, t ≤ n). (2)
holds with high probability, namely with probability at least 1− n−2.
We need to define a suitable confidence radius rt(p), which we want to be as small as possible subject
to (2). Note that rt(p) must be defined in terms of quantities that are observable at time t, such as Nt(p) and
Ŝt(p). A standard confidence radius used in the literature is (essentially) rt(p) =
√
Θ(log n)
Nt(p)+1
.
Instead, we use a more elaborate confidence radius from [33]:
rt(p) ,
α
Nt(p) + 1
+
√
α Ŝt(p)
Nt(p) + 1
, for some α = Θ(log n). (3)
The confidence radius in (3) performs as well as the standard one in the worst case: rt(p) ≤
√
O(logn)
Nt(p)+1
, and
much better for very small sales rates: rt(p) ≤ O(logn)Nt(p)+1 ; see Appendix 4.3 for a self-contained proof.
To recap, we have
It(p) , p ·min(k, n (Ŝt(p) + rt(p))), where rt(p) is from (3). (4)
Finally, the active prices are given by
P = {δ(1 + δ)i ∈ [0, 1] : i ∈ N}, where δ ∈ (0, 1) is a parameter. (5)
This completes the specification of CappedUCB. See Mechanism 1 for the pseudocode.
Mechanism 1 Pricing strategy CappedUCB for n agents and k items
Parameter: δ ∈ (0, 1)
1: P ← {δ(1 + δ)i ∈ [0, 1] : i ∈ N} {“active prices”}
2: While there is at least one item left, in each round t
pick any price p ∈ argmaxp∈P It(p), where It(p) is the “index” given by (4).
3: For all remaining agents, set price p =∞.
4.2 Analysis of the pricing strategy
Our goal is to bound from above the regret of CappedUCB, which is the difference between the optimal ex-
pected revenue of a fixed-price strategy and the expected revenue of CappedUCB. We prove that CappedUCB
achieves regret O(k log n)2/3 for a suitable choice of parameter δ in (5).
Lemma 4.1. CappedUCB with parameter δ = k−1/3 (log n)2/3 achieves regret O(k log n)2/3.
Since the bound in Lemma 4.1 is trivial for k < log2 n, we will assume that k ≥ log2 n from now on.
Note that CappedUCB “exits” (sets the price to ∞) after it sells k items. For a thought experiment,
consider a version of this pricing strategy that does not “exit” and continues running as if it has unlimited
supply of items; let us call this version CappedUCB′. Then the realized revenue of CappedUCB is exactly
equal to the realized revenue obtained by CappedUCB′ from selling the first k items. Thus from here on we
focus on analyzing the latter.
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We will use the following notation. LetXt be the indicator variable of the random event that CappedUCB′
makes a sale in round t. Note that Xt is a 0-1 random variable with expectation S(pt), where pt depends
on X1, . . . ,Xt−1. Let X ,
∑n
t=1 Xt be the total number of sales if the inventory were unlimited. Note
that E[X] = S ,
∑n
t=1 S(pt). Going back to our original algorithm, let R̂ev denote the realized revenue of
CappedUCB (revenue that is realized in a given execution). Then
R̂ev =
∑N
t=1 ptXt, where N = max{N ≤ n :
∑N
t=1Xt ≤ k}. (6)
High-probability events. We tame the randomness inherent in the sales Xt by setting up three high-
probability events, as described below. In the rest of the analysis, we will argue deterministically under
the assumption that these three events hold. It suffices because the expected loss in revenue from the low-
probability failure events will be negligible. The three events are summarized in the following claim:
Claim 4.2. With probability at least 1− n−2 holds, for each round t and each price p ∈ P:
|S(p)− Ŝt(p)| ≤ rt(p) ≤ 3
(
α
Nt(p)+1
+
√
αSt(p)
Nt(p)+1
)
, (7)
|X − S| < O(
√
S log n+ log n), (8)
|∑nt=1 pt(Xt − S(pt))| < O(√S log n+ log n). (9)
The probability bounds on the three events in Claim 4.2 are derived via appropriate concentration in-
equalities, some of which are non-standard; see Section 4.3 for further discussion. In the first event, the left
inequality asserts that rt(p) is a confidence radius, and the right inequality gives the performance guarantee
for it. The other two events focus on CappedUCB′, and bound the deviation of the total number of sales (X)
and the realized revenue (∑nt=1 ptXt) from their respective expectations; importantly, these bound are in
terms of
√
S rather than
√
n.
In the rest of the analysis we will assume that the three events in Claim 4.2 hold deterministically.
Single-round analysis. Let us analyze what happens in a particular round t of the pricing strategy. Let pt
be the price chosen in round t. Let p∗act ∈ argmaxp∈P ν(p) be the best active price according to ν(·), and let
ν∗act , ν(p∗act). Let ∆(p) , max(0, 1n ν
∗
act − p S(p)) be our notion of “badness” of price p, compared to the
optimal approximate revenue ν∗. We will use this notation throughout the analysis, and eventually we will
bound regret in terms of
∑
p∈P ∆(p)N(p), where N(p) is the total number of times price p is chosen.
Claim 4.3. For each price p ∈ P it holds that
N(p)∆(p) ≤ O(log n)
(
1 + kn
1
∆(p)
)
. (10)
Proof. By definition (2) of the confidence radius, for each price p ∈ P and each round t we have
ν(p) ≤ It(p) ≤ p ·min (k, n (S(p) + 2 rt(p))) . (11)
Let us use this to connect each choice pt with ν∗act:{
It(pt) ≥ It(p∗act) ≥ ν(p∗act) , ν∗act
It(pt) ≤ pt ·min (k, n (S(pt) + 2 rt(pt))) .
Combining these two inequalities, we obtain the key inequality:
1
n ν
∗
act ≤ pt ·min
(
k
n , S(pt) + 2 rt(pt)
)
. (12)
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There are several consequences for pt and ∆(pt):
pt ≥ 1k ν∗act
∆(pt) ≤ 2 pt rt(pt)
∆(pt) > 0 ⇒ S(pt) < kn
. (13)
The first two lines in (13) follow immediately from (12). To obtain the third line, note that ∆(pt) > 0
implies pt k ≥ ν∗act > npt S(pt), which in turn implies S(pt) < kn .
Note that we have not yet used the definition (3) of the confidence radius. For each price p = pt, let t be
the last round in which this price has been selected by the pricing strategy. Note that N(p) (the total number
of times price p is chosen) is equal to Nt(p) + 1. Then using the second line in (13) to bound ∆(p), Eq. (7)
to bound the confidence radius rt(p), and the third line in (13) to bound the sales rate, we obtain:
∆(p) ≤ O(p)×max
(
logn
N(p) ,
√
k
n
logn
N(p)
)
.
Rearranging the terms, we can bound N(p) in terms of ∆(p) and obtain (10).
Analyzing the total revenue. A key step is the following claim that allows us to consider
∑n
t=1 pt S(pt)
instead of the realized revenue R̂ev, effectively ignoring the capacity constraint. This is where we use the
high-probability events (8) and (9). For brevity, let us denote β(S) = O(√S log n+ log n).
Claim 4.4. R̂ev ≥ min(ν∗act,
∑n
t=1 pt S(pt))− β(k).
Proof. Recall that pt ≥ 1kν∗act by (13). It follows that R̂ev ≥ ν∗act whenever
∑n
t=1Xt > k. Therefore, if
R̂ev < ν∗act then
∑n
t=1Xt ≤ k and so R̂ev =
∑n
t=1 ptXt. Thus, by (9) it holds that
R̂ev ≥ min (ν∗act,
∑n
t=1 ptXt) ≥ min (ν∗act,
∑n
t=1 pt S(pt)− β(S)) .
So the claim holds when S ≤ k. On the other hand, if S > k then by (8) it holds that
X ≥ S − β(S) ≥ k − β(k)
R̂ev ≥ min(k,X) ( 1k ν∗act) ≥ ν∗act − β(k).
In light of Claim 4.4, we can now focus on
∑n
t=1 pt S(pt).∑n
t=1 pt S(pt) ≥
∑n
t=1
1
n ν
∗
act −∆(pt)
= ν∗act −
∑n
t=1 ∆(pt)
= ν∗act −
∑
p∈P ∆(p)N(p). (14)
Fix a parameter ǫ > 0 to be specified later, and denote{
Psel , {p ∈ P : N(p) ≥ 1}
Pǫ , {p ∈ Psel : ∆(p) ≥ ǫ}
to be, respectively, be the set of prices that have been selected at least once and the set of prices of badness
at least ǫ that have been selected at least once. Plugging (10) into (14), we obtain∑
p∈P ∆(p)N(p) ≤
∑
p∈Psel\Pǫ ∆(p)N(p) +
∑
p∈Pǫ ∆(p)N(p)
≤ ǫn+O(log n)∑p∈Pǫ (1 + kn 1∆(p))
≤ ǫn+O(log n)
(
|Pǫ|+ kn
∑
p∈Pǫ
1
∆(p)
)
. (15)
Combining (14), (15) and Claim 4.4 yields a claim that summarizes our findings so far.
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Claim 4.5. For any set P of active prices and any parameter ǫ > 0 it holds that
ν∗act − E[R̂ev] ≤ ǫn+O(log n)
(
|Pǫ|+ kn
∑
p∈Pǫ
1
∆(p)
)
+ β(k).
Interestingly, this claim holds for any set of active prices. The following claim, however, takes advantage
of the fact that the active prices are given by (5).
Claim 4.6. ν∗act ≥ ν∗ − δk, where ν∗ , maxp ν(p).
Proof. Let p∗ ∈ argmaxp ν(p) denote the best fixed price with respect to ν(·), ties broken arbitrarily. If
p∗ ≤ δ then ν∗ ≤ δk. Else, letting p0 = max{p ∈ P : p ≤ p∗} we have p0/p ≥ 11+δ ≥ 1− δ, and so
ν∗act ≥ ν(p0) ≥ p0p∗ ν(p∗) ≥ ν∗(1− δ) ≥ ν∗ − δk.
It follows that for any ǫ > 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1) we have:
Regret ≤ O(log n)
(
|Pǫ|+ kn
∑
p∈Pǫ
1
∆(p)
)
+ ǫn+ δk + β(k). (16)
The rest is a standard computation. Plugging in ∆(p) ≥ ǫ for each p ∈ Pǫ in (16), we obtain:
Regret ≤ O(|Pǫ| log n)
(
1 + 1ǫ
k
n
)
+ ǫn+ δk + β(k).
Note that |P| ≤ 1δ log n. To simplify the computation, we will assume that δ ≥ 1n and ǫ = δ kn . Then
Regret ≤ O
(
δk + 1
δ2
(log n)2 +
√
k log n
)
. (17)
Finally, it remains to pick δ to minimize the right-hand side of (17). Let us simply take δ such that the first
two summands are equal: δ = k−1/3 (log n)2/3. Then the two summands are equal to O(k log n)2/3. This
completes the proof of Lemma 4.1.
4.3 Concentration inequalities and the proof of Claim 4.2
We use an elementary concentration inequality known as Chernoff Bounds, in a formulation from [38].
Theorem 4.7 (Chernoff Bounds). Consider n i.i.d. random variables X1 . . . Xn with values in [0, 1]. Let
X = 1n
∑n
i=1Xi be their average, and let µ = E[X]. Then:
(a) Pr[|X − µ| > δµ] < 2 e−µnδ2/3 for any δ ∈ (0, 1).
(b) Pr[X > a] < 2−an for any a > 6µ.
Further, we use a non-standard corollary from [33] 10 which provides us with a sharper (i.e., smaller)
confidence radius when µ is small; we include the proof for the sake of completeness.
Theorem 4.8 ([33]). Consider n i.i.d. random variables X1 . . . Xn on [0, 1]. Let X be their average, and
let µ = E[X]. Then for any α > 0, letting r(α, x) = αn +
√
αx
n , we have:
Pr [ |X − µ| < r(α,X) < 3 r(α, µ) ] > 1− e−Ω(α),
10This is Lemma 4.9 in the full (arXiv) version of [33].
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Proof. First, suppose µ ≥ α6n . Apply Theorem 4.7(a) with δ = 12
√
α
6µn . Thus with probability at least
1− e−Ω(α) we have |X − µ| < δµ ≤ µ/2. Plugging in the δ,
|X − µ| < 12
√
αµ
n ≤
√
αX
n ≤ r(α,X) < 1.5 r(α, µ).
Now suppose µ < α6n . Then using Theorem 4.7(b) with a = αn , we obtain that with probability at least
1− 2−Ω(α) we have X < αn , and therefore |X − µ| < αn < r(α,X) and
|X − µ| < αn < r(α,X) < (1 +
√
2) αn < 3 r(α, µ).
Proof of (7) in Claim 4.2. For each price p ∈ P let {Zi,p}i≤n be a family of independent 0-1 random
variables with expectation S(p). Without loss of generality, let us pretend that the i-th time that price p is
selected by the pricing strategy, sale happens if and only if Zi,p = 1. Then by Lemma 4.8 after the i-th play
of price p the bound (7) holds with probability at least 1−n−4. Taking the Union Bound over all choices of
i and all choices of p, we obtain that (7) holds with probability at least 1− n−2 as long as |P| ≤ n (which
is the case for us).
Sharper Azuma-Hoeffding inequality. We use a concentration inequality on the sum of n random vari-
ables Xt ∈ {0, 1} such that each variable Xt is a random coin toss with probability Mt that depends on the
previous variables X1, . . . ,Xt−1. We are interested in bounding the deviation |X −M |, where X =
∑
tXt
and M =
∑
tMt. The well-known Azuma-Hoeffding inequality states that with high probability we have
|X −M | ≤ O(√n log n). However, we need a sharper high-probability bound: |X −M | ≤ O(√M log n).
Moreover, we need an extension of such bound which considers deviation |∑nt=1 αt(Xt−Mt)|, where each
multiplier αt ∈ [0, 1] is determined by X1, . . . ,Xt−1.
We use the following concentration inequality from the literature.
Theorem 4.9 (Theorem 3.15 in [37]). Let Z1, . . . , Zn be random variables which take values in [−1, 1]. Let
Z =
∑n
t=1 Zt, µ = E[Z]. Let V =
∑n
t=1 Var(Zt|Z1, . . . , Zt−1). Then for any a > 0, v > 0 we have
Pr [(|Z − µ| ≥ a) ∧ (V ≤ v)] ≤ e−Ω(
a2
v+a ).
We use the above bound to bound the deviation for |∑nt=1 αt(Xt −Mt)|.
Theorem 4.10. Let X1, . . . ,Xn be 0-1 random variables. For each t, let αt ∈ [0, 1] be the multiplier
determined by X1, . . . ,Xt−1. Let M =
∑n
t=1 Mt, where Mt = E[Xt|X1, . . . ,Xt−1] for each t. Then for
any b ≥ 1 the event
|∑nt=1 αt(Xt −Mt)| ≤ b(√M log n+ log n).
holds with probability at least 1− n−Ω(b).
Proof. Let Zt = Xt − yt, where yt ∈ [0, 1] is a function of X1, . . . ,Xt−1, and let Z =
∑n
t=1 Zt.
We claim that
Pr
[|∑nt=1 αt(Zt − E[Zt])| ≤ b(√M log n+ log n)] ≥ 1− n−Ω(b), for any b ≥ 1. (18)
To prove (18), let Ft = σ(X1, . . . ,Xt) be the σ-algebra generated by X1, . . . ,Xt, and let Mt =
E[Xt|X1, . . . ,Xt−1]. Then conditional on Ft−1, Zt is a random variable with expectation Mt − yt and
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two possible values, −αt yt and αt (1 − yt), where αt and yt are constants. It follows that Var(Zt|Ft−1) =
α2t (Mt −M2t ) ≤Mt, and therefore V ,
∑n
t=1 Var(Zt|Ft−1) ≤M .
Taking Theorem 4.9 with a = b(
√
v log n+ log n), we have that for any b ≥ 1 the event
(|Z − E[Z]| ≥ b(
√
v log n+ log n)) ∧ (V ≤ v).
holds with probability at most n−Ω(b). Finally, we take the Union Bound over (say) all integer v between
log n and n, noting that V ≤M . This completes the proof of (18).
Finally, to prove the theorem take (18) with yt = Mt and note that Zt = Xt−Mt and so E[Zt] = 0.
Proof of (8) and (9) in Claim 4.2. Recall that for each t, Xt is a 0-1 random variable with expectation
S(pt), where pt depends on X1, . . . ,Xt−1. Using Lemma 4.10 with αt ≡ 1 we obtain (8). Using
Lemma 4.10 with αt = pt we obtain (9).
5 The O(
√
k logn) regret bound (Theorem 1.3)
We show that the pricing strategy from Section 4 (with a different parameter) satisfies an improved regret
bound, O(
√
k log n), if the demand distribution is regular and moreover the ratio kn is sufficiently small. The
regret bound depends on a distribution-specific constant.
Theorem 5.1. For any regular demand distribution F there exist positive constants sF and cF such that
CappedUCB with parameter δ = k−1/2 log(n) achieves regret O(cF
√
k log n) whenever kn ≤ sF . For
monotone hazard rate distributions we can take sF = 14 .
Proof. Let g(s) , s S−1(s) be a function from [S(1), 1] to [0, 1] that maps a sales rate to the corresponding
revenue. Regularity implies g′′(·) ≤ 0. Since g′(0) > 0, we can pick a constant sF > 0 such that
C , g′(sF ) > 0. For monotone hazard rate distributions we can take sF = 14 because for any maximizer
s of g(·) it holds that s ≥ 1e (see Claim B.2). Now, for any kn ≤ sF we have that g′( kn) ≥ C . We will
use this to obtain a lower bound on ∆(p); any such lower bound is absent in the analysis in Section 4. This
improvement results in savings in (16), which in turn implies the claimed regret bound.
We will use the notation from Section 4.2, particularly the “badness” ∆(p) and the set Pǫ of arms of
badness ≥ ǫ that have been selected at least once. Note that by regularity g′(s) ≥ C for any s ∈ (0, kn). Let
p∗ = S−1( kn) and p ∈ Pǫ. By the third line in (13) it holds that S(p) < kn and then p > p∗.
First, we claim that S(p) < p
∗
p
k
n . Indeed, this is because p S(p) = g(S(p)) < g(
k
n ) = p
∗ k
n .
Second, we bound ∆(p) from below:
1
n ν
∗
act ≥ (1− δ) ν
∗
n ≥ (1− δ) g( kn )
∆(p) ≥ (1− δ) g( kn )− g(S(p))
≥ [g( kn )− g(S(p))] − δ g( kn )
≥ C( kn − S(p))− δ kn p∗
≥ C kn (1− p
∗
p )− δ kn p∗
≥ C kn (1− p
∗
p (1 +
δ
C )).
Since P is given by (5), it holds that Pǫ ⊂ {p∗α (1 + δ)i : i ∈ N} for some α ≥ 1. Define
P ′ , {p ∈ Pǫ : p = p∗α (1 + δ)i with i ≥ 2C }.
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Then for any p ∈ P ′ it holds that p/p∗ = α(1 + δ)i ≥ 1 + iδ and therefore
∆(p) ≥ C kn (1− 1+δ/C1+iδ ) ≥ C2 kn iδ1+iδ .
Therefore, noting that |P ′| ≤ |P| ≤ O(1δ log 1δ ), we have
k
n
∑
p∈P ′
1
∆(p) ≤ 2C
∑
p∈P ′ (1 +
1
iδ ) ≤ 2C (|P ′|+ 1δ log |P ′|) ≤ O( 1C 1δ log 1δ )∑
p∈Pǫ\P ′
1
∆(p) ≤ 1ǫ |P \ P ′| ≤ 1ǫ ( 2C + 1).
Plugging this into (16) with ǫ = δ kn , we obtain:
k
n
∑
p∈Pǫ
1
∆(p) ≤ O(1δ log 1δ )(1 + 1C )
Regret ≤ O(δk + 1δ (1 + 1C )(log n)2 +
√
k log n) (19)
≤ O(cF
√
k log n), where cF = 1 + 1/C.
The regret bound (19) improves over the corresponding bound (17) in Section 4. We obtain the final bound
by plugging δ = k−1/2 log n.
It is desirable to achieve the bounds in Theorem 1.2 and Theorem 5.1 using the same pricing strategy.
Unfortunately, the choice of parameter δ in Theorem 5.1 results in a trivial O(k) regret guarantee for arbi-
trary demand distributions (as per Equation (17)). However, varying δ and using Equations (17) and (19)
we obtain a family of pricing strategies that improve over the bound in Theorem 1.2 for the “nice” setting in
Theorem 5.1, and moreover have non-trivial regret bounds for arbitrary demand distributions.
Theorem 5.2. For each γ ∈ [13 , 12 ], consider pricing strategy CappedUCB with parameter δ = O˜(k−γ). This
pricing strategy achieves regret O˜(k1−γ)(1+ 1/g′( kn)) if the demand distribution is regular and g′( kn) > 0,
and regret O˜(k2γ) for arbitrary demand distributions.
6 Lower Bounds
We prove two lower bounds on regret over all demand distributions which match the upper bounds in Theo-
rem 1.2 and Theorem 1.3, respectively. (Note that the latter upper bound is specific to regular distributions.)
Throughout this section, regret is with respect to the fixed-price benchmark.
Theorem 6.1. Consider the dynamic pricing problem with limited supply: with n agents and k ≤ n items.
(a) No detail-free pricing strategy can achieve regret o(k2/3) for arbitrarily large k, n.
(b) For any γ < 12 , no detail-free pricing strategy can achieve regret O(cF kγ) for all demand distri-
butions F and arbitrarily large k, n, where the constant cF can depend on F .
Our proof is a black-box reduction to the unlimited supply case (k = n). The unlimited supply case of
Theorem 6.1 is proved in [34] (see Footnote 7 on page 5).
Proof. Suppose that some pricing strategy A violates part (a). Then there is a sequence {ki, ni}i∈N, where
ki ≤ ni and {ki}i∈N is strictly increasing, such that A achieves regret o(k2/3) for all problem instances with
ni agents and ki items, for each i ∈ N. To obtain a contradiction, let us use A to solve the unlimited supply
problem with regret o(n2/3). Specifically, we will solve problem instances with ki/4 agents, for each i.
Fix i ∈ N and let k = ki and n = ni. Consider a problem instance I with unlimited supply and k/4
agents and sales rate S(·). Let I ′ be an artificial problem instance with unlimited supply and n agents, so
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that the first k/4 agents in I ′ correspond to I . Form an artificial problem instance J with k items and n
agents as follows: in each round, A outputs a price, then with probability k/2n this price is offered to the
next agent in I ′, and with the remaining probability there is no interaction with agents in I ′ and no sale.
Since the demand distribution for J is a mixture of the “no sale” event which happens with probability
1− k2n and the original demand distribution for I , the sales rate for J is given by SJ (p) = k2nS(p).
Running A on problem instance J induces a pricing strategy A′ on the original problem instance I .11
In the rest of the proof we show that A′ achieves regret o(k2/3) on I .
Let RevJ (A) and R̂evJ (A) be, respectively, the expected revenue and the realized revenue of A on
problem instance J . Let r = argmaxp pS(p) be the Myerson reserve price, and let Ar be the fixed-price
strategy with price r. By our assumption, we have that RevJ (A) ≥ RevJ (Ar) − o(k2/3). We need to
deduce that RevI(A′) ≥ RevI(Ar)− o(k2/3).
Let N be the number of rounds in J in which A interacts with the agents in I ′. With high probability
k
4 < N < k. Let us condition on N and the event EN , {k/4 < N < k}:
E[ R̂evJ (Ar) |N, EN ] = NrS(r)
E[ R̂evJ (A)− R̂evI(A′) |N, EN ] ≤ (N − k4 ) rS(r).
Since E[N ] = k2 , it follows that
RevI(A′) ≥ RevJ (A)− k4 rS(r)− o(1)
≥ RevJ (Ar)− k4 rS(r)− o(k2/3)
= k4 rS(r)− o(k2/3)
= RevI(Ar)− o(k2/3),
as required. The reduction for part (b) proceeds similarly.
7 Selling very few items: proof of Theorem 1.5
In this section we target a case when very few items are available for sale (roughly, k < O(log2 n)), so that
the bound in Theorem 1.1 becomes trivial. We provide a different pricing strategy whose regret does not
depend on n, under the mild assumption of monotone hazard rate.
We rely on the characterization in Claim 3.2: we look for the price p∗ = max(pr, S−1( kn )), where pr =
argmaxp p S(p) is the Myerson reserve price. The pricing strategy proceeds as follows (see Mechanism 2 on
page 17). It considers prices pℓ = (1− δ)ℓ, ℓ ∈ N sequentially in the descending order. For each ℓ, it offers
the price pℓ to a fixed number of agents. The loop stops once the pricing strategy detects that, essentially,
the “best” pℓ has been reached: either S(pℓ) is close to kn , or we are near a maximum of p S(p). Parameters
are chosen so as to minimize regret.
Theorem 7.1. For some parameters ǫ and δ, Mechanism 2 achieves regret O
(
k3/4 poly log(k)
)
with respect
to the offline benchmark, for any demand distribution that satisfies the monotone hazard rate condition.
The rest of this section is devoted to proving Theorem 7.1 for parameters ǫ = k−1/4 and δ = ( 1k log k)
1/4
.
We will assume that the demand distribution is MHR, without further notice. We derive Theorem 7.1 from
the following multiplicative bound; it appears difficult to prove the additive version directly.
11If A stops before it iterates through all agents in I, the remaining agents in I are offered a price of ∞.
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Mechanism 2 Descending prices
Parameter: Approximation parameters δ, ǫ ∈ [0, 1]
1: Let α =
(
k
n
)1−δ
, γ = min(α, 1/e).
2: ℓ← 0, ℓmax ← 0, Rmax ← 0.
3: repeat
4: ℓ← ℓ+ 1, pℓ ← (1 + δ)−ℓ
5: Offer price pℓ to m = ⌈δ nlog1+δ(1/ǫ)⌉ agents.
6: Let Sℓ be the fraction of them who accept.
7: Let Rℓ = pℓSℓ be the average per agent revenue.
8: If Sℓ ≥ (1 + δ)−1γ and Rℓ ≥ Rmax,
9: then Rmax ← Rℓ, ℓmax ← ℓ
10: until pℓ ≤ ǫ or Sℓ ≥ (1 + δ)α or Rℓ ≤ (1 + δ)−2Rmax
11: Offer price p˜ = pℓ so long as unsold items remain.
Lemma 7.2. Assume p∗ ≥ ǫ. Set δ = 4
√
1
k log k log
1
ǫ log log
1
ǫ . Then the expected revenue of Mechanism 2
is at least 1−O(δ) fraction of the offline benchmark.
Proof of Theorem 7.1. If p∗ ≤ ǫ then the expected loss in revenue is at most ǫk. Else by Lemma 7.2 the
expected loss in revenue is at most O(δk), where δ is from Lemma 7.2. In both cases the additive regret
compared to the offline benchmark is at most max(ǫk,O(kδ)). Finally, pick ǫ = k−1/4.
7.1 Proof of Lemma 7.2
We use a multiplicative bound in which fixed-price strategies for limited supply are compared to those for
unlimited supply (which in turn can be compared to the offline benchmark using Claim A.2).
Lemma 7.3. Assume the demand distribution is regular. Let p′ ≤ p be two prices such that p ≥ S−1(k/n).
Let n′ ≤ n. Then Rev(An′k (p′)) ≥ n
′
n
p′
p
(
1− 1√
2πk
)
Rev(Ann(p)).
The proof uses a technique from [44], see Appendix A. Also, we take advantage of several properties of
MHR distributions, detailed in Appendix B.
We say the exploration phase is δ-approximate if
S(pℓ) ≥ γ ⇒ 11+δ ≤ Sℓ/S(pℓ) ≤ 1 + δ.
Claim 7.4. The exploration phase is δ-approximate with probability at least 1− 2 (log1+δ 1ǫ ) e−δ
2γm/4
.
Proof. This follows directly by applying Chernoff bounds (both the upper and lower tail form) to the event
that some Sℓ violates the condition, then applying the union bound over all choices of ℓ.
Claim 7.5. When the exploration phase is δ-approximate, we have (1− 7δ)S−1 ( kn) ≤ p˜ ≤ p∗.
Proof. It is easy to see that none of the stopping conditions of the exploration phase can be triggered until
the price goes below p∗. Therefore p˜ ≤ p∗. For the other inequality observe that, by Claim B.3 it holds that
S−1(α) ≥ (1− δ)S−1( kn). Therefore it suffices to show that p˜ ≥ (1− 6δ)S−1(α).
Assume for a contradiction that the stopping conditions are not triggered in some phase ℓ such that
pℓ+1 < (1 + δ)
−6 S−1(α). Therefore, at round ℓ we have
pℓ = (1 + δ)pℓ+1 < (1 + δ)
−5 S−1(α) (20)
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Examining the stopping conditions, and using our assumption above, we deduce that:
Sℓ < (1 + δ)α (21)
Rmax/Rℓ < (1 + δ)
2, (22)
Combining (20) and (21), we get
Rℓ = pℓSℓ < (1 + δ)
−4αS−1(α) (23)
Note that, since we chose round ℓ such that pℓ ≪ S−1(α), the pricing strategy already encountered some
round t < ℓ such that pt is“close” to S−1(α) – in particular
(1 + δ)−1S−1(α) ≤ pt ≤ S−1(α) (24)
and therefore also S(pt) ≥ α. Since we assume the exploration phase is δ-approximate, the estimated sales
rate at round t satisfies St ≥ (1 + δ)−1S(pt) ≥ (1 + δ)−1α. Combining this with (24), we get that the
estimated revenue Rt at round t satisfies
Rt = ptSt ≥ (1 + δ)−2αS−1(α) (25)
The value of Rmax in round ℓ is at least Rt. Combining (25) with (23), this shows that at round ℓ we
have RmaxRℓ > (1 + δ)
2
, contradicting (22).
Claim 7.6. When the exploration phase is δ-approximate, we have R(p˜) ≥ (1− 7δ)R(p∗).
Proof. By Claim 7.5, we are done when p∗ = S−1 ( kn). Therefore, assume p∗ = pr, the Myerson reserve
price. It is easy to see that R(pℓ+1) ≥ 11+δ R(pℓ) for each ℓ. Let t be the first integer such that pt ≤ p∗ = pr.
Note that (1 + δ)−1p∗ ≤ pt ≤ p∗. Claim 7.5 says that p˜ ≤ p∗ = pr, therefore ℓ˜ ≥ t and by Claim B.2
S(pt) ≥ S(pr) ≥ 1/e ≥ γ. It suffices to show that a stopping condition must be triggered before R(pℓ) gets
too small.
Assume for a contradiction that the stopping condition is not triggered by phase ℓ ≥ t, for some ℓ
such that R(pℓ+1) < (1 − 7δ)R(p∗). Since R decreases slowly as described above, it follows that t < ℓ.
Moreover, since we assumed the exploration phase is δ-approximate, St ≥ 11+δ S(pt) ≥ 11+δ γ. Therefore,
during phase ℓ we have Rmax ≥ Rt = Stpt ≥ ( 11+δ )2 R(p∗). Since no stopping condition is triggered
for phase ℓ, it must be that Rℓ ≥ ( 11+δ )2 Rmax ≥ ( 11+δ )4 R(p∗). Moreover R(pℓ+1) ≥ 11+δ R(pℓ) ≥
( 11+δ )
2 Rℓ ≥ ( 11+δ )6R(p∗), a contradiction.
We can now complete the proof of Lemma 7.2.
We condition on the exploration phase being δ-approximate. Let n′ and k′ be the number of players and
items left after the exploration phase, respectively. In the exploitation phase, we attain expected revenue
Rev(An
′
k′ (p˜)). Moreover, in the exploration phase we attained revenue at least (k− k′)p˜, since we only used
prices greater than or equal to p˜. Therefore, the total expected revenue of our pricing strategy is at least
Rev(An′k′ (p˜)) + (k′ − k)p˜. It is easy to see that this is at least Rev(An
′
k (p˜)).
It remains to bound the expected revenue of An′k (p˜). Observe that n
′
n ≥ 1 − δ. For brevity, denote
β , (1− 1√
2πk
).
There are two cases. In the first case, p∗ = S−1( kn). Lemma 7.3 and Claim 7.5 imply that
Rev(An′k (p˜)) ≥ β
n′
n
p˜
p∗
Rev(Ann(p∗)) ≥ β (1− 8δ) Rev(Ann(p∗)).
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The second case is p∗ = pr. By Claim 7.6 and unimodality of R, we have that
Rev(Ann(max(S−1( kn), p˜))) ≥ Rev(Ann(p˜)) ≥ (1− 7δ) Rev(Ann(p∗)).
Moreover, using Lemma 7.3, Claim 7.5, and the equation above we show that
Rev(An′k (p˜)) ≥ β (1− 8δ) Rev(Ann(max(S−1( kn), p˜))) ≥ β (1− 15δ) Rev(Ann(p∗)).
By Lemma A.2, Mechanism 2 achieves, in expectation, at least the following fraction of the expected
revenue of the offline benchmark:
β (1−O(δ)) (1− 2 log1+δ(1ǫ ) exp(−14 δ2γm)) .
Now, plug δ into Lemma 7.2, and m as defined in the pricing strategy. Note that m = Θ( δ2nlog 1/ǫ). We obtain
the final bound replacing γ by the lesser quantity kn , and using the fact that log1+δ(x) = Θ(
1
δ log x).
8 Conclusions and open questions
We consider dynamic pricing with limited supply and achieve near-optimal performance using an index-
based bandit-style algorithm. A key idea in designing this algorithm is that we define the index of an arm
(price) according to the estimated expected total payoff from this arm given the known constraints.
While in this paper we apply the above key idea to a specific index-based algorithm (UCB1), it can be
seen as an (informal) general reduction for index-based algorithms for dynamic pricing, from unlimited
supply to limited supply. This reduction may help with more general dynamic pricing settings (more on that
below), and moreover it might be extended to other bandit-style settings where the “best arm” is not an arm
with the best expected per-round payoff. In particular, [1] uses a version of this reduction in the context of
adaptive quality control in crowdsourcing.
It is an interesting open question whether a reduction such as above can be made more formal, and which
algorithms and which settings it can be applied to. An ambitions conjecture for our setting is that there is
a simple black-box reduction from unlimited supply to limited supply that applies to arbitrary “reasonable”
algorithms. In the full generality this conjecture appears problematic; in particular, some reasonable bandit
algorithms such as EXP3 are hard-coded to spend a prohibitively large amount of time on exploration.
This paper gives rise to a number of more concrete open questions. The most immediate ones concern
extending our upper and lower bounds for, respectively, more general and more specific classes of demand
functions. First, it is desirable to extend Theorem 1.1 to possibly irregular distributions, i.e. obtain non-
trivial regret bounds with respect to the offline benchmark. Second, one wonders whether the optimal
O(cF
√
k) regret rate from Theorem 1.3 can be extended to all regular demand distributions. Third, it is
open whether our lower bounds can be strengthened to regular demand distributions.
For arbitrary (possibly irregular) distributions, one can show that, essentially, the appropriate benchmark
is a mixture of two fixed prices rather than one fixed price. In a recent follow-up work [11], the authors design
regret-minimizing algorithms that compete with this randomized benchmark. In fact, their results extend to
a much more general setting of explore-exploit problems with resource utilization constraints.
Further, it is desirable to extend dynamic pricing with limited supply beyond IID valuations. For ex-
ample, most results on secretary problems [8] hold under a weaker assumption: random permutation of
adversarially chosen values; however, our results do not immediately extend to this model. More generally,
one would like to handle adversarial valuations, or perhaps identify assumptions which make the problem
tractable. One natural direction is to bound the number or frequency of changes. An initial result in this
direction [14] allows the demand distribution to change at most once, at some point in time that is unknown
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to the mechanism. Alternatively, one could bound the rate of change. A promising approach here is to apply
the reduction from this paper to index-based algorithms for the corresponding bandit setting [42, 41].
On a final note, we observe that selling at a given price provides some information about the smaller
prices, whereas our algorithms do not directly use this information (and neither does the prior work [34, 13]).
Likewise, our algorithms do not update the estimates for a given price using the estimates for other prices
using the fact that the sales rate S(p) is non-increasing in the price p. It is somewhat surprising that our
main algorithm achieves near-optimal regret without taking advantage of this additional information. While
such information might help in practice, the extent to which it can possibly help is an open question.
Acknowledgements. We are grateful to Jason Hartline, Qiqi Yan and Assaf Zeevi for their comments.
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Appendix A: Benchmark comparison
We start with a self-contained proof of a slightly weaker version of Lemma 3.1 (which suffices for the
purposes of this paper).
Lemma A.1 (Yan [44]). For each regular demand distribution there exists a fixed-price strategy whose
expected revenue is at least the offline benchmark minus O(√k log k).
Recall that Ank(p) denotes the fixed-price strategy with k items, n agents, and fixed price p. Let Mnk de-
note the optimal (expected revenue maximizing) offline auction with n-players and k-items. As in Claim 3.2,
let p∗ = max(pr, S−1( kn )), where pr = argmaxp p S(p) is the Myerson reserve price.
Claim A.2. If the demand distribution is regular then Rev(Ann(p∗)) ≥ Rev(Mnk ).
Proof of Claim A.2. Let qi be the probability that Mnk sells to agent i. By symmetry, qi = qj for all players i
and j, so we simply denote this probability by q. Let p = S−1(q) be the single price we would need to offer
a agent in order to sell to him with probability q. Since R is a concave function of the selling probability,
Jensen’s inequality implies that R(p) is an upper bound on the revenue collected by the Myerson auction
from a single agent. Equivalently: nR(p) ≥ Rev(Mnk ).
Now, observe that the expected number of items sold by Mnk is nq. Since Mnk never sells more than k
items, it must be that q ≤ kn . Therefore, p ≥ S−1( kn). By definition of p∗, we deduce that there are two
cases: (1) p∗ = pr, or (2) pr ≤ p∗ = S−1( kn) ≤ p. In case (1) it is clear that R(p∗) ≥ R(p). In case (2) we
get that R(p∗) ≥ R(p) since R(x) is decreasing for x ≥ pr. Then
Rev(Ann(p
∗)) = nR(p∗) ≥ nR(p) ≥ Rev(Mnk ).
Lemma A.1 follows from Claim A.2 and Claim 3.2 because for p = p∗ we have S(p) ≤ kn , and so
ν(p) = p min(k, n S(p)) = np∗ S(p∗) = Rev(Ann(p
∗)) ≥ Rev(Mnk ).
Multiplicative bounds. Further, we derive a multiplicative bound in which fixed-price strategies for lim-
ited supply are compared to those for unlimited supply. We use this bound to prove Lemma 7.3.
Claim A.3. For any regular demand distribution and any p ≥ S−1( kn) it holds that
Rev(Ank(p)) ≥
(
1− 1√
2πk
)
Rev(Ann(p)).
Proof. The proof uses a technique from [44]. As a thought experiment, consider an environment where agent
valuations are correlated as follows: The joint distribution of agent valuations can be sampled by choosing a
set S′ of k players uniformly at random, then for each agent in S′ sampling from the conditional distribution
F (x)|x≥S−1(k/n), and for each agent not in S′ sampling from the conditional distribution F (x)|x<S−1(k/n).
Observe that each agent’s valuation is distributed according to F , yet at any point exactly k players have
value exceeding S−1(k/n).
Let T ′ be the set of players in this correlated environment whose valuation exceeds p. The probability
of a particular agent being included in T ′ is S(p), and E[|T ′|] = nS(p). Since p ≥ S−1(k/n), it is clear
that T ′ ⊆ S′ and therefore 0 ≤ |T ′| ≤ k.
Now consider our original environment where each agent’s valuation is drawn i.i.d from F . Let T be
the set of players in this environment whose valuations exceed p. The probability of a agent being included
in T is S(p) – the same as the probability of being included in T ′. However, each agent is included in T
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independently with probability S(p). As a result, some of the players in T do not win an item – this happens
when |T | > k. We can write the revenue of Ank(p) in this i.i.d environment as follows.
Rev(Ank(p)) = pE[min(|T |, k) ] (26)
Now, observe that r(Y ) = min(|Y |, k) is the rank function of the k-uniform matroid. Moreover, it was
shown in [44] that the correlation gap of this function is β ,
(
1− 1√
2πk
)
. Therefore, since each agent is
included in T independently, we know by the definition of the correlation gap and the fact that T and T ′
have the same marginals that
E[r(T )] ≥ β E[r(T ′)]. (27)
Recall that T ′ is always bounded between 0 and k, therefore r(T ′) = |T ′|. Combining (26) and (27), we get
Rev(Ank(p)) = p E[min(|T |, k) ] ≥ β pE[|T ′|] = β pnS(p)) = β Rev(Ann(p))).
Corollary (Lemma 7.3). Assume the demand distribution is regular. Let p ≤ p′ be two prices such that
p ≥ S−1(k/n). Let n′ ≤ n. Then Rev(An′k (p′)) ≥ n
′
n
p′
p
(
1− 1√
2πk
)
Rev(Ann(p)).
Proof. Observe that Ank(p′) sells at least as many items as Ank(p) for every realization of the bids, but at
price p′ instead of p. Therefore Rev(Ank(p′)) ≥ p
′
p Rev(A
n
k(p)). Combining with Claim A.3 we get that
Rev(Ank (p
′)) ≥ p′p
(
1− 1√
2πk
)
Rev(Ann(p)).
Next, a simple (omitted) argument shows that the revenue Rev(Ank(p)) of a fixed price auction exhibits
diminishing marginal returns in the number n of players. Therefore, Rev(An′k (p)) ≥ n
′
n Rev(A
n
k(p)).
Let us note in passing that Claim A.3 and Claim 3.2 imply a stronger, multiplicative version of Lemma 3.1,
which is also immediate from [44].
Lemma A.4 (Yan [44]). Assume that the demand distribution is regular. Then there exists a fixed-price
strategy whose expected revenue approximates the offline benchmark up to a factor 1− 1√
2πk
.
Appendix B: Monotone Hazard Rate distributions
Let us state and prove several properties of Monotone Hazard Rate (MHR) distributions which we use in
Section 5 and Section 7. Throughout, for a distribution F we use F (x) to denote the c.d.f, S(x) = 1−F (x)
to denote the sales rate, and f(x) to denote the p.d.f.
We begin with a simple known characterization of MHR distributions.
Fact B.1. A distribution is MHR if and only if S(·) is log-concave (i.e. log S(x) is a concave function of x).
Next, we bound the sales rate at the Myerson reserve price.
Claim B.2. Let F be an MHR distribution with support on [0,∞], and let S(x) = 1 − F (x). Let r ∈
argmaxR(·) where R(x) = xS(x). Then S(r) ≥ 1/e.
Proof. We have R′(r) = S(r) + rS′(r) = 0. Moreover, by Fact B.1 we deduce that
log S(r)
r
≥ d
dx
log(S(x))|r = S
′(r)
S(r)
Combining with the previous equality, we have −1r ≤ log(S(r))r which is equivalent to S(r) ≥ 1e .
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We now use log-concavity to bound the sensitivity of the inverse of the sales rate.
Claim B.3. Let F be an MHR distribution with support on [0,∞], and let α, β ∈ [0, 1] with β ≥ α. Then
S−1(β) ≥ log(β)
log(α)
S−1(α)
Proof. By Fact B.1, f(x) = log(S(x)) is a concave, decreasing function of x such that f(0) = 0 and
f(x)→ −∞ as x→∞. By Jensen’s inequality, for every a, b ∈ [0,∞] with b ≤ a we have f(b)/f(a) ≤ ba .
Plugging a = S−1(α) and b = S−1(β) into this inequality completes the proof.
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